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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the existing relationship between economic growth and the monitoring 
of corruption and examines the possible outcome of the implementation of a State reform in 
order to weed out corruption. Growth is always higher when monitoring is high and therefore 
corruption eradicated. But growth declines when monitoring against corruption is not too 
high, say intermediate, so much that it makes an equilibrium with corruption and little 
monitoring a more growth-enhancing solution. It is also stressed that when reforms to 
combat corruption appear to be implausible, they tend to curb most productive investments. 
The model is estimated using a dynamic panel data approach for Italy. Italy has been 
plagued by corruption and in the late 80s and early 90s several scandals erupted which led 
to the well-known "Clean Hands" (Mani pulite) inquiries. Empirical results support the 
theoretical model.  
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1 Introduction
During the last thirty years economists from various fields have contributed
to the analysis of corruption. The first paper that received widespread
attention was published in 1975 (Rose-Ackerman, 1975). Since then many
works have appeared in the economic literature and much attention has been
paid to the relationship between corruption and economic growth. There are
several ways in which corruption may reduce economic growth. Corruption
can act as a tax and thus lower incentives to invest. Corruption could cause
talented people to engage in rent-seeking rather than productive activities.
Corruption may distort the composition of government expenditure as
corrupt politicians could be expected to invest in large non-productive
projects from which considerable bribes can be exacted more easily than
from productive activities. Recent empirical analysis has also provided
evidence of the negative effects of corruption on economic growth (for an
excellent survey see Abed and Gupta, 2002). Only in some cases, it has been
argued that the economic benefits of corruption outweigh its cost. According
to Huntington (1968) “[i]n terms of economic growth, the only thing worse
than a society with a rigid, over-centralized dishonest bureaucracy, is one
with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy”.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical endogenous growth model which
incorporates corruption. In our model, the social loss of corruption stems
from the fact that entrepreneurs must bribe a bureaucrat in order to
invest, and consequently devote fewer resources to the accumulation of
capital. Therefore in our model corruption has a negative effect on private
investment. Other models share our framework. Ehrlich and Lui (1999)
claim that individuals have an incentive to compete over the privilege of
becoming bureaucrats (the so-called investment in political capital) since
they obtain economic rents through corruption. This investment in political
capital consumes economic resources which could otherwise be used for
production or investment in human capital. In Del Monte and Papagni
(2001), corruption arises when bureaucrats manage public resources to
produce public goods and services. Corruption reduces the quality of public
infrastructure resulting in a negative effect on economic growth. Barreto
(2000) presents a simple neoclassical endogenous growth model where the
public sector’s monopolistic position is explicitly considered. His findings
indicate that a corruption equilibrium is characterized by lower growth
rates compared to the ideal situation in which public goods are provided
competitively. He also shows that if the public sector is subject to significant
bureaucratic red-tape, all of the agents within the economy may prefer the
corruption equilibrium, as corruption can bypass bureaucratic obstacles.
The novel feature of our paper is a study of the impact of monitoring of
corruption on economic growth. In our theoretical model we derive a non-
linear relationship between the level of monitoring and economic growth,
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as well as between corruption and economic growth. At low monitoring
levels the economy experiences widespread corruption and medium growth
rates; at intermediate monitoring levels no corruption occurs, but low
growth rates are recorded; whereas at high monitoring levels no corruption
occurs and high growth rates are recorded. With reference to this non-
linear relationship, we then consider the effect of a reform aimed at
weeding out corruption. When a reform is announced, economic agents
define an expected probability regarding its permanence in time. If agents
underestimate the probability of monitoring by the State, the effect of such
a reform could be to lead the economy to an unintended equilibrium with
low growth. The non-linear relationship between growth and monitoring
is finally investigated empirically over the period 1980-2003 in Italy. In
order to study this relationship new measures of monitoring are used. Our
empirical evidence supports the conclusions of the model.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 studies the relationship between
the level of monitoring, corruption, and economic growth. In addition, a
possible outcome of a State reform to curb corruption in terms of growth is
examined. In section 3, empirical implications from the theoretical model
are evaluated. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
Let us consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good y. Firms
manufacture y with one input, capital, using one of two technologies with
constant returns to scale: the modern sector technology and the one of the
traditional sector. Each entrepreneur is assumed to have the same quantity
of capital k. The product may be either manufactured for consumption
purposes or for investment purposes. The modern sector technology is
y = aMk. The entrepreneurs in the modern sector must obtain a licence from
the government to access the technology. In order to obtain such a licence,
an entrepreneur must submit a project to a bureaucrat and this act involves
an implementation cost of sk.1 The entrepreneur may access the traditional
sector without any licence being issued. In this case the output is y = aTk.
From this point onwards, it is assumed that (aM −s) > aT > 0, i.e. that the
modern sector is more profitable than the traditional sector. In this economy
there are three types of players: the State, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs.
There is a continuum of bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, and their number
is normalized to 1. Economic agents are risk-neutral. While entrepreneurs
may invest their total capital in the modern sector or in the traditional
one, bureaucrats cannot invest in the production activity, earning a fixed
1The cost of the project submission to the bureaucrat is a function of the investment.
The underlying assumption is that, as the size of the investment grows, the cost for the
entrepreneur’s bureaucratic practices also grows.
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salary w. It is assumed that no arbitrage is possible between the public
and the private sector allowing bureaucrats to become entrepreneurs, even
if their salary w is lower than the entrepreneur’s net return.2 Bureaucrats
are corruptible, in the sense that they pursue their own interest, and not
necessarily the one of the State. Bureaucrats are open to bribery as they
issue the licence required to access the modern sector technology to the
entrepreneurs submitting a project. The State controls the bureaucrats in
such a way that they have a probability q (monitoring level) of being detected
if they undertake a corrupt transaction.
In this model, the bureaucrat may decide not to ask for a bribe and to issue
the licence to those entrepreneurs who submit a project, or else to ask for a
bribe (represented by b) in exchange for the licence. Since (aM − s) > aT ,
the entrepreneur might find it worthwhile to offer a bribe to the corrupt
bureaucrat with a view to obtaining the necessary licence to access the
modern sector. The bureaucrat is assumed to have both monopolistic power
(i.e. after having submitted the project, the entrepreneur cannot turn to any
other bureaucrat to obtain the licence) and discretional power over granting
the licence (i.e. the bureaucrat may refuse to issue the licence without
being required to provide any explanation). If the bureaucrat is detected
while performing a corrupt transaction, he incurs a cost (either monetary,
moral, or criminal) equal to mk, where m >0; the entrepreneur, if detected,
incurs a cost (either monetary, moral, or criminal) equal to ck, where c >0,
but he is refunded the cost of the bribe paid to the bureaucrat3.
2.1 Game Description
In the following, we refer to the entrepreneur payoff by using the superscript
(E) and to the bureaucrat payoff by using the superscript (B). These
represent the first and the second element of the payoff vector η
i
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
respectively. Consider the following three-period game:
Stage 1. At stage one of the game, the entrepreneur decides in which
sector to operate, i.e. whether to invest his capital in the modern or
in the traditional sector. Such a decision is tantamount to the decision
of whether to submit the project to the bureaucrat, considering that
a licence is needed to invest in the modern sector. Project submission
does not automatically result in the bureaucrat issuing a licence, as
he may refuse to grant the licence unless a bribe b is paid. If the
entrepreneur decides not to submit the project (preferring to invest
in the traditional sector instead) the game ends and then the payoff
2This may be assumed since although individuals in the population (bureaucrats) have
a job, they have no access to capital markets, and therefore may not become entrepreneurs.
3See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for details regarding the assumption of a non-constant
punishment function.
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vector is given by:
η
1
= (aTk,w) (1)
If the entrepreneur decides to submit the project, he asks the
bureaucrat to issue the licence. In this case the game continues to
stage two.
Stage 2. At this stage the bureaucrat, on facing an entrepreneur who has
submitted a project incurring a cost sk, may decide to issue the licence
without asking for a bribe (b = 0).4 In this case the game ends and
the payoff vector is given by:
η
2
= (aMk − sk, w) (2)
Alternatively, if he demands the payment of a bribe (b > 0) from the
entrepreneur before he agrees to issue the licence, the game continues
to stage three.
Stage 3. At stage three the entrepreneur must decide whether to pay a
bribe or not. Should he decide to negotiate the payment of a bribe
with the bureaucrat, the two parties will find the bribe corresponding
to the Nash solution to a bargaining game (bNB). If the entrepreneur
decides not to negotiate with the bureaucrat, the latter will refuse to
issue the licence; thus the game ends with the bureaucrat receiving his
salary and the entrepreneur, after having been denied the licence, will
be left with no other option but to invest in the traditional sector. In
this case the game ends and the corresponding payoff vector is given
by:
η
3
= (aTk − sk, w) (3)
If the entrepreneur decides to pay the bribe, the expected payoffs
will depend on the probability q with which the bureaucrat and the
entrepreneur are monitored. In this case, the expected payoff vector
is given by:
η
4
=
(
(aM − s)k − qck − bNB(1− q), w − qmk + bNB(1− q)
)
(4)
It should be noted that by construction η
2
is preferred to η
3
by both agents,
and therefore the bureaucrat will never ask for a bribe which he knows that
the entrepreneur would turn down.
4If agents are indifferent about whether to ask for a bribe or not, they will prefer to
be honest.
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2.2 The Solution to the Game
The model described in the previous section well reflects the pervasive
uncertainty which is typically experienced by entrepreneurs when dealing
with the Public Administration. The game may be solved by starting from
the last stage using backward induction, determining the bribe bNB (which
is the Nash solution to a bargaining game). The bribe bNB is the outcome of
a negotiation between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur (see Appendix
A1 for the proof).
Proposition 2.1. Let q 6= 1.5 Then there is a unique non negative bribe
(bNB), as the Nash solution to a bargaining game, given by:
bNB = µ
[
(aM − aT )k
(1− q) −
q(c−m)k
(1− q)
]
. (5)
where µ ≡ αα+ω is the share of the surplus that goes to the bureaucrat, and
α and ω are parameters that can be interpreted as the bargaining strength
measures of the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur respectively.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the entrepreneur and the
bureaucrat share the surplus on an equal basis. Thus we have a standard
Nash case, when α = ω = 1 and the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat receive
equal shares. Hence the bribe is equal to:
bNB =
1
2
[
(aM − aT )k
(1− q) −
q(c−m)k
(1− q)
]
. (6)
2.2.1 Static equilibrium
The game is solved by means of backward induction starting from the
last stage and the solution is formalized by the following proposition (see
Appendix A2). We here focus on the case where parameters allow the
greatest number of equilibria depending on the level of monitoring by the
State6.
Proposition 2.2. Define q2 =
(aM−aT )
(c+m) − 2s(c+m) and q1 = (aM−aT )(c+m) with
q1 > q2. Then, if q2 ≥ 0, q1 ≤ 1 and (c+m) > 2s:
(a) If q ∈ [0, q2] then the equilibrium payoff vector is:
η
4
=
(
(aM + aT )k
2
− sk − q(c+m)k
2
, w +
(aM − aT )k
2
− q(c+m)k
2
)
(7)
this is the payoff vector connected to equilibrium C (see below);
5If q = 1 this stage of the game is never reached.
6In the Appendix A3 we show the results under all parameter conditions.
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(b) if q2 < q < q1 the equilibrium payoff vector is:
η
1
= (aTk,w) (8)
this is the payoff vector connected to equilibrium B (see below);
(c) If q ∈ [q1, 1] the equilibrium payoff vector is:
η
2
= ((aM − s)k,w) (9)
this is the payoff vector connected to equilibrium A (see below).
The previous proposition shows that, depending on the parameter values,
one of the three perfect Nash equilibria is obtained in the subgames:
• Equilibrium C: corruption and high output. When 0 ≤ q ≤ q2, i.e.
if the monitoring level is low enough, the entrepreneur will enter the
modern sector and will be asked to pay a bribe by the bureaucrat.
Monitoring intensity is so low that the difference in gross profits,
(aM − aT )k, between the modern and the traditional sector is high
enough to outweigh a (relatively low) expected cost of corruption and
the cost of the project.
• Equilibrium B: no corruption and low output. When q2 < q < q1, i.e.
if the monitoring level is intermediate, the entrepreneur will not enter
the modern sector and therefore will not ask for a licence. Monitoring
intensity is not low enough for the entrepreneur to justify paying for the
cost of the project along with the additional expected cost of paying a
bribe. The difference in gross profits between modern and traditional
sector does not compensate for the expected cost of corruption plus
the cost of the project. Furthermore, monitoring intensity is not of a
high enough level to deter the bureaucrat from asking a bribe in case
the entrepreneur were to pay the cost of the project.
• Equilibrium A: no corruption and high output. When q ≥ q1, i.e. if
the monitoring level is high enough, the level of monitoring intensity by
the State is so high that the entrepreneur would turn down a request
for a bribe even after having paid the (sunk) cost of submitting a
project. Realising this fact, the bureaucrat will refrain from asking
for a bribe to issue the licence. Thus the entrepreneur will enter the
modern sector and will not be asked for a bribe by the bureaucrat.
Notice that in equilibriumB there is no corruption but low output compared
to equilibrium C where corruption is at its highest, but output is higher.
Should a State wish to lead the economy towards one of these three viable
equilibria by employing a certain level of monitoring, it would realise that
equilibria A and C imply a greater output than equilibrium B. Equilibria
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A and C allow the same output to be obtained, even though they are
considerably different from one another in terms of level of corruption (which
is greatest in C and nonexistent in A).
From a static perspective, the equilibrium A is better than equilibrium C
which implies the same output of equilibrium A but is characterized by
widespread corruption, entailing higher cost, summarized by parameters c
and m. A is also better than B, while B and C cannot be ranked a priori.
2.2.2 Dynamic equilibrium
Following the work of Del Monte and Papagni (2007), we expand the game
perspective in order to examine the dynamic consequences of corruption
on economic growth and hence on investment. Satisfaction is derived from
consumption according to a simple constant elasticity utility function:
U =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ
Each entrepreneur maximizes utility over an infinite period of time subject
to a budget constraint. This problem is formalized as:
max
c∈<+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(C)dt
sub •
k = ηEi − C
where C is consumption, ρ is the discount rate over time, ηEi is the
entrepreneur’s payoff.
Since ηEi is different in each of the three equilibria, the problem is solved for
each of the three cases. In the equilibrium with corruption (equilibrium C),
the entrepreneur’s payoff is:
ηE4 =
[
(aM + aT )k
2
− sk − q(c+m)k
2
]
thus the constraint is:
•
k =
[
(aM + aT )k
2
− sk − q(c+m)k
2
]
− C
The Hamiltonian function is:
H = e−ρt
C1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ
[
(aM + aT )k
2
− sk − q(c+m)k
2
− C
]
where λ is a costate variable. Optimization provides the following first-order
conditions:
e−ρtC−σ − λ = 0 (10)
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and
•
λ = −λ
[
(aM + aT )
2
− s− q(c+m)
2
]
(11)
By differentiating the first condition (10) with respect to time and
substituting it into the second condition (11), the consumption growth rate
is obtained:
γCC =
1
σ
[
(aM + aT )
2
− s− q(c+m)
2
− ρ
]
In equilibrium A, the entrepreneur’s payoff is:
ηE2 = aMk − sk
In this case, optimization provides the first-order conditions that allow the
corresponding consumption growth rate to be obtained:
γCA =
1
σ
[aM − s− ρ]
In equilibrium B, the entrepreneur’s payoff is:
ηE1 = aTk
and the corresponding consumption growth rate is:
γCB =
1
σ
[aT − ρ]
It should be noted that:
γCA > γ
C
C > γ
C
B
i.e. the equilibrium A (no corruption, high-level monitoring) has the
highest consumption growth rate; in equilibrium C (pervasive corruption,
low monitoring) the consumption growth rate is intermediate; and finally
in equilibrium B (no corruption, intermediate monitoring level) the
entrepreneur invests in the traditional sector, with low profits, low
accumulation of capital and a low growth rate. Furthermore, it can be shown
that capital and income also have the same growth rate as consumption.
Therefore, of the three equilibria, from a dynamic viewpoint, equilibrium
A is the most conducive to economic growth. This is shown in Figure 1
in terms of monitoring level and growth rate: equilibrium A (high-level
monitoring without corruption) produces the highest growth rate since the
entrepreneurs, who are investing in the modern sector without paying bribes,
are able to generate greater accumulation of capital; in equilibrium C the
growth rate is intermediate since although the entrepreneur manages to
invest in the modern sector, he must pay bribes in order to do so and ends
up accumulating less; finally in equilibriumB the entrepreneur invests in the
8
Figure 1: Monitoring and Growth rate.
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traditional sector, with low revenues and low accumulation of capital. Thus
a non-linear U-shaped relationship between the monitoring of corruption
and economic growth is obtained which shall be tested empirically in the
next section.
Before doing that, notice that a farsighted State, with long-term
objectives, will be encouraged to implement a reform to weed out corruption
by leading the economy from equilibrium C to equilibrium A, by means of
increasing the level of monitoring q. While this is true also for the static
context of the previous section, it should be noted the added advantage that
arises in a dynamic context; not only do the costs of corruption decline, but
also investment, consumption and output are higher when the State raises
the monitoring intensity to a sufficiently high level. Let us thus assume that:
a) The economy is at an equilibrium characterized by widespread
corruption, i.e. at equilibrium C, where q∗ is the current monitoring level
with 0 ≤ q∗ ≤ q2;
b) The State announces that a higher monitoring level will be
implemented, and one by which the probability of being monitored while
performing a corrupt transaction increases from q∗ to q1, with 0 ≤ q∗ ≤ q2.
Hence we assume that the economy initially has a high level of corruption
and economic growth is at an intermediate level, and that the State
announces a reform designed to increase growth and eradicate corruption (to
achieve equilibrium A). Since q1 is the minimum monitoring level required
for the economy to achieve equilibriumA, the State will raise the probability
of being monitored to q1.
We assume that agents will formulate expectations regarding whether or not
the reform will last over time. Economic agents are assumed to estimate that
there is a given probability (1−pi) that monitoring will revert to the previous
level q∗. It is further assumed that the State is unaware of this belief held by
economic agents. When a reform is announced, economic agents evaluate the
probability of being detected (qe), weighted according to their assessment of
whether or not the reform will last over time. The probability expected by
the operators is qe with qe < q1 and equal to qe = q1pi + q∗(1 − pi). In this
case, even if the State intends to increase monitoring to steer the economy
to equilibrium A, operators will expect a lower value of monitoring, qe. If
this value is such that:
(aM − aT )− 2s
(c+m)
< qe <
(aM − aT )
(c+m)
the economy ends up at equilibrium B. In terms of economic growth this
outcome is not only worse than equilibrium A to which the State aspires to,
but is also worse than the baseline equilibrium C. In fact, equilibrium B is
characterized by a growth rate lower than not only of equilibrium A, but
also of equilibrium C.
Although the reform was intended to foster growth by eradicating
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corruption, due to its lack of credibility it induces entrepreneurs to invest in
the traditional sector rather than in the more innovative modern sector.
Thus the level of economic growth was higher before the reform, when
corruption was prevalent. This feature of the model reflects the oft-heard
argument that “corruption greases the wheels of growth”, but also qualifies
it. Only if the State lacks complete control of the monitoring technology can
such prescription apply. A credible, appropriate reform will always foster
growth by curbing corruption.
3 Empirical Analysis
The relatively recent Italian nationwide Mani Pulite (“Clean Hands”)
scandal, in conjunction with judicial authorities implementing greater
levels of monitoring as a consequence, drastically affected Italy’s economic
environment. This Italian experience lends itself naturally to verify the
impact of the announcement and implementation of a “monitoring reform”
on corruption and growth.7 This section aims to empirically investigate the
relationship between the level of monitoring of corruption and economic
growth in Italy. The non-linear character of the relationship between
monitoring level and the growth rate of income is formalized by using
an empirical specification reflecting a parabolic relation between these
two variables. The theoretical model is tested using new measures of
monitoring.8
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on annual data from Italian regions over
the period 1980-2003. With the exception of monitoring and human
capital variables, the annual data are drawn from the Prometeia Regional
Accounting data-set (courtesy of ISAE). The data relating to monitoring
are selected from ISTAT and the Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze,
and data regarding human capital are drawn from the Costantini-Destefanis
(2009) data-set. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the variables
and their sources. The descriptive statistics of the variables are found in
7Mani pulite (Italian for “Clean Hands”) was a nationwide Italian judicial investigation
into political corruption, held in the 1990s. As Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) said “In
Italy the history of corruption does not begin (let alone end) on February 17, 1992 (the
official date that Clean Hands began). What starts at that point are the extraordinary
events of public exposure of corruption, a scandal affecting the highest levels of the political
and economic system, causing the most serious political crisis of the Italian Republic”.
The corruption system that is uncovered by these investigations is usually referred to as
Tangentopoli, or “bribesville”.
8In recent years several authors have investigated the causes and consequences of
corruption in Italy (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001; Golden and Picci, 2005; Del Monte
and Papagni, 2007)
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Appendix C.
As regards the monitoring variable, three different measures are provided
with a view to studying the effects of monitoring on economic growth. The
first is based on the number of corruption crimes and is denoted as M1.
The second and the third measures use the number of pertinent judges
and policemen as proxies to indicate how much of the State resources are
allocated to fighting corruption related crimes. These two measures are
denoted as M2 and M3. The first measure (M1) is the ratio between the
number of corruption crimes detected and the estimated total number of
corruption crimes (see Appendix D). This is an ex-post variable since it only
considers the results of State control activity. Therefore this index expresses
the effectiveness of the monitoring activity, i.e. the monitoring which leads
to the corrupt bureaucrat being successfully charged. The second and third
measures are based respectively on the number of judges assigned to penal
law cases (M2) and on the number of policemen employed in the investigation
of corruption related crimes (M3). Incentives for corruption increase as the
probability of being caught and punished decreases and this probability is
positively dependent on the actions of judges and policemen. These two
proxies are of an ex-ante nature, since they allow us to assess the level of
monitoring implemented by the State.
3.2 Estimation Methods
The specification of the basic estimated equation corresponds to a reduced
form so as to evaluate the implications of the theoretical model. Following
the work of Levine and Renelt (1992), a degree of convergence on the most
appropriate empirical specification for modeling growth has occurred (see
Temple, 1999). Our base specification is fundamentally a “Levine-Renelt”
one with the addition of the monitoring variable. We differ in that since
our estimating model is dynamic rather than static (see Greenaway et al.,
1998, 2002) and the growth rate is included as a regressor (lagged by one
period). This specification has an obvious intuitive appeal in that it models
growth in a dynamic context. However, when a lagged dependent variable
is included in the regression, a correlation between the error term and this
variables may be found. To provide consistent estimates, an instrumental
variable procedure is adopted (see discussion on the GMM system estimator
below). The regression equation is:
gyit = β1gyit−1 + β2lnyit−1 + β3ln(monitorit−1) + β4(ln(monitorit−1))
2+
+ β5invit + β6conpait + β7hit + eit, (12)
where gyit is the growth rate of the per capita income at 2000 constant
prices, gyit−1 is the lagged growth rate of the per-capita income, lnyit−1 is
the logarithm of lagged value of the per capita income level, ln(monitorit−1)
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is the log monitoring level delayed by one period, (ln(monitorit−1))2 is the
square of the logarithm of the monitoring variable lagged by one period,
invit is the share of investment in GDP, conpait is public consumption over
GDP and hit is the stock of human capital.9 The term eit represents the
error term, which is assumed to be IID. The index i refers to the cross-
section dimension (regions) and the index t to the time dimension. The
share of investment over GDP and the level of public consumption over GDP
are important control variables.10 The “monitoring” variable is included in
the equation with a delay of one period for two reasons: firstly, because
changes in the monitoring level are very likely to require some time before
they influence the agents’ decisions;11 and secondly, any distortions due to
simultaneity, resulting from the possible endogeneity of the “monitoring”
variable, need to be mitigated, since a higher growth rate may result in
more tax revenue and therefore more resources being allocated to monitoring
activity.
Equation (12) is estimated using a GMM system estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The first step of
the estimation procedure is to ensure that the model is either specified with
fixed effects or with random effects. In our case, the fixed effect model has
been preferred as the Hausman test results suggest (35.32, p-value 0.00).
In the dynamic panel, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent, even
though the error term is not serially correlated (see Hsiao, 2003). The LSDV
(least square dummy variable) model with a lagged dependent variable
generates biased estimates when the time dimension of the panel is small
(see Nickell, 1981), while when the time dimension is large (up to 30
observations), a corrected LSDV estimator seems to work better with respect
to the OLS, IV and GMM estimators, with the GMM estimators as a second
best solution (see Judson and Owen, 1999). However, the correction for
LSDV derived by Bun and Kiviet (2003) for balanced panels only works
with exogenous explanatory variables. For this reason equation (12) was
estimated with a system of GMM estimators developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). A finite sample correction for
the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005) is used in the
estimation of the equation (12). This correction makes the robust two-step
procedure more efficient than the one-step procedure, especially for system
GMM. The estimation results are summarized in the next section.
9Details of data-set construction are found in Costantini and Destefanis (2009).
10See Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992).
11Del Monte and Papagni (2001) use two lags for the corruption variable in the economic
growth regression equation for Italian regions.
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3.3 Results
The estimation results are reported in Table 1. For all equations, the
instruments used are “yit”, “gyit”, monitor, monitor
2, Inv and conpa lagged
for two periods. Furthermore two period dummies are used as instruments
in all regressions as they are related to the monitoring variable. Dummy1
relates to the 90s decade and includes the entry into force of law n. 86 (26th
of April, 1990) which substantially modified the provisions of the penal code
with regard to corruption. Dummy2 takes account of the beginning of the
“Clean hands” investigation (1992).
The estimated regression coefficients of the square of the logarithm of
the monitoring variables are all positive (see Table 1). This confirms the
existence of a parabola-shaped relationship with the concavity upwards as
predicted by the theoretical model. The estimated coefficients are also
statistically significant. As regards, interpreting the effect of the square
of the logarithm of the monitoring variable on economic growth, since the
coefficient of the logarithm of the monitoring is negative and the coefficient
of the square of the logarithm of monitoring is positive, this equation implies
that at low values of monitoring additional monitoring units have a negative
effect on the dependent variable. At some point, the effect becomes positive,
and the quadratic shape indicates that the impact of monitoring on growth
is increasing as the monitoring itself increases. The sign of the parameter β1
is positive in all cases, signifying a positive correlation between the lagged
delayed growth rate and the income growth rate at time t. The associated
t-statistics are also significant.
The coefficient on the lnyit is used to test the convergence hypothesis.12
A negative sign denotes conditional convergence of growth rates. In our
estimation, the sign of the parameter β2 is negative in all cases and varies
from -0.123 to -0.165. These estimated coefficients are also statistically
significant. As regards the investment/GDP ratio (Inv) variable, the
estimated coefficients are all positive and statistically significant. The values
of these coefficients vary from 0.143 to 0.165. These results would seem to
be in line with the literature concerning growth models (see e.g. Levine
and Renelt, 1992) and similar findings are also found in other studies of
Italian regions (see Auteri and Costantini, 2004). With respect to the
public consumption variable, positive coefficients are found in all cases. The
estimated coefficient values vary from 0.188 to 0.247 and are all statistically
significant. Del Monte and Papagni (2007) found similar results, although
their evidence of a positive impact of public consumption on economic
growth is weaker. As regards the human capital variable, a positive and
statistically significant effect on economic growth is also found. The level
of education has a crucial impact on growth as it determines the economy’s
12Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Kelly (1992) are early examples of endogenous growth
models compatible with β − convergence.
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capacity to (i) carry out technological innovation and, most importantly
for less developed regions, (ii) adopt and efficiently utilize technology from
richer regions which is the case in Italy.
In order to assess the validity of all the results, two diagnostic tests
were performed: The Hansen test of the over identifying restrictions and
the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) autocorrelation in the first-
difference residuals. As regards the Hansen test, the chi-squared statistics
values for M1, M2 andM3 regressions are 17.18, 16.98 and 16.67 respectively.
The associated p-values are 0.900, 0.921 and 0.913. With regard to the z-
statistics of the Arellano-Bond test, the following results for M1, M2 andM3
regressions are found: 0.270, 0.210 and 0.450. The associated p-values are
0.743, 0.790 and 0.685. Test results support the validity of the instruments
used in the estimation.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, a new theoretical model of the link between monitoring
of corruption and growth is developed. The model highlights the non-
linear relationship between the level of State monitoring and economic
growth. The economy would clearly benefit should corruption be completely
eradicated as a result of State reforms and greater controls. However, should
the State fail to successfully convince agents about the effectiveness of such
reforms, the level of corruption may be reduced, but economic growth could
also suffer due to a consequential lack of investment. Thus a State wishing
to introduce a reform to reduce corruption and improve economic growth
should consider this non-linear nature of the corruption-economic growth
relationship. The relationship is investigated using regional data for Italy
over the period 1980-2003. The empirical results support the predictions of
the model.
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Table 1: Growth and Monitoring in panel data. 1980-2003
Dependent variable: gyit
Variables M1 M2 M3
gyi,t−1 0.310 0.354 0.231
(3.02)∗∗ (2.47)∗∗ (2.51)∗∗
ln(yi,t−1) -0.102 -0.104 -0.121
(2.33)∗∗ (2.40)∗∗ (2.35)∗∗
ln(monitori,t−1) -0.039 -0.032 -0.039
(2.89)∗∗ (2.28)∗∗ (2.89)∗∗
(ln(monitori,t−1))2 0.022 0.023 0.016
(3.29)∗ (2.27)∗∗ (2.29)∗∗
Inv 0.143 0.165 0.154
(2.95)∗∗ (2.91)∗∗ (2.64)∗∗
conpa 0.247 0.202 0.188
(1.86)∗ (2.32)∗∗ (1.83)∗
hit 0.042 0.056 0.048
(3.42)∗∗ (2.18)∗∗ (2.31)∗
constant 0.378 0.362 0.328
(1.61) (3.16)∗∗ (1.54)
Hansen test: χ2 17.18 16.98 16.67
p-values 0.900 0.921 0.913
z-statistics 0.270 0.210 0.450
p-values 0.743 0.790 0.685
No. of observations 475 457 457
Notes : i) t-statistics are in parenthesis; ii) * and ** denote 5% and 10% significant results,
respectively. iii) z-statistics indicates Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation in the
first-difference residuals.
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Appendix A
A1: The Nash Bargaining bribe bNB
Let φ
∆
= φ(E)∆ , φ
(B)
∆ be the vector of the differences in the payoffs between
the case of agreement and disagreement regarding the bribe between the
the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat. In accordance with generalized Nash
bargaining theory, the division between two agents will solve:
max
b∈<+
[φ(E)∆ ]
ω · [φ(B)∆ ]α (13)
in formula
max
b∈<+
[(aM − aT )k − ckq − (1− q)b]ω [(1− q)b− qkm]α (14)
which is the maximum of the product between the elements of φ
∆
and
where [(aTk − sk), w] is the point of disagreement, i.e. the payoffs that the
entrepreneur and the bureaucrat would obtain respectively if they failed to
reach an agreement. The parameters ω and α can be interpreted as measures
of bargaining strength. It is now easy to check that the bureaucrat gets a
share µ = αα+ω of the surplus τ , i.e. the bribe is b
NB = µτ . More generally
µ reflects the distribution of bargaining strength between the two agents.
Then the bribe bNB is an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash bargaining
solution and is given by:
bNB = µ
[
(aM − aT )k
(1− q) −
q(c−m)k
(1− q)
]
(15)
which is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, ∀q 6= 1.
A2: Solution to the static game
The static game is solved using backward induction, which enables the
equilibria to be obtained.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. Backward induction method.
(3) At stage three the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and only if,
η
(E)
4 > η
(E)
3 ⇒ (aTk − sk) <
(aM + aT )k
2
− sk − q(c+m)k
2
that is if the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe his payoff is greater
than his payoff if he refuses. That is verified ∀q < (aM−aT )(c+m) = q1.
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Notice that in order to have an admissible probability set, q must
belong to [0, 1]. It should be noted that q1 is greater than one by
assumption.
Furthermore, from now on we assume that q1 < 1, i.e. the difference in
returns between the two sectors must not be greater than the expected
cost of corruption; consequently the presence of the probability q
determines the entrepreneur’s choice of whether to enter into the
transaction. Then if q < q1 the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe,
otherwise if q ≥ q1 he refuses the bribe.13
(2) Ascending the decision-making tree, at stage two the bureaucrat
decides whether or not to ask for a bribe.
• Let q ≥ q1 then the bureaucrat knows that the entrepreneur will
not accept any bribe. Should he decide not to ask for a bribe, his
payoff will be w, whereas should he decide to ask for a bribe, he knows
there is no room for negotiation, and therefore he will refuse to grant
the licence to the entrepreneur, who will be forced to invest in the
traditional sector. In this case the bureaucrat’s payoff will be w. Thus
the bureaucrat’s payoff is the same as if he decides to ask for a bribe
equal to zero. As noted, in this case of equal payoffs, it may be assumed
that the bureaucrat will prefer to be “honest”, and thus not to ask for
a bribe.
• Let q < q1 then the bureaucrat knows that if he asks for a bribe
then the entrepreneur will start a negotiation and the final bribe will
be bNB. Then, at stage two the bureaucrat asks for a bribe if and
only if the bureaucrat’s payoff on asking for a bribe is greater than his
payoff if he doesn’t.
η
(B)
4 > η
(B)
2 ⇒
w +
(aM − aT )k
2
− q(c+m)k
2
> w
that holds ∀q < q1. Thus we can conclude that if q < q1 then the
bureaucrat asks for a bribe that the entrepreneur accepts.
(1) At stage one the entrepreneur has to decide whether to present the
project.
• Let q ≥ q1 then the entrepreneur knows that if he presents a project
no bribe will be asked. Should he decide not to submit the project,
his payoff will be equal to aTk, whereas if he decides to submit his
project, his payoff will be equal to aMk−sk. Therefore he will present
the project if and only if
η
(E)
2 > η
(E)
1 ⇒ aMk − sk > aT
13Otherwise if q1 ≥ 1 then the entrepreneur will always negotiate the bribe. See
appendix A3 for details.
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The previous inequality is always verified by hypothesis.
• Let q < q1 then the entrepreneur knows that the bureaucrat will ask
for the bribe that he will accept. Should he decide not to submit the
project, his payoff will be aTk, whereas should he decide to submit
the project and to pay the bribe to the bureaucrat, his payoff will be
(aM−aT )k
2 − sk − q(c+m)k2 .
Thus the entrepreneur decides to submit the project if and only if
ηE4 ≥ ηE1 ⇒
(aM − aT )k
2
− sk − q(c+m)k
2
≥ aTk
which is verified if and only if
q ≤ (aM − aT )− 2s
(c+m)
= q2.
Because q2 < q1 and since we assumed that q1 ≤ 1, then q2 ≤ 1. From
now on we assume that q2 > 0, i.e. half of the surplus (as the difference
than the returns of the two productivity sectors) must be greater then
the project cost14.
14For the other cases see Appendix A3.
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A3: Equilibria under all parameter conditions
If (c +m) > 2s we obtain the following five cases depending on parameter
conditions:
Table 2: Equilibria (c+m) ≥ 2s
Parameter conditions Equilibria
q2 < 0⇔ (aM − aT ) < 2s
and
q1 ≤ 1⇔ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c+m) Equilibria B and A
⇒ (aM − aT ) < 2s
q2 < 0⇔ (aM − aT ) < 2s
and
q1 > 1⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) Not applicable
⇒ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) and (aM − aT ) < 2s
q2 ≥ 0⇔ (aM − aT ) ≥ 2s
and
q1 ≤ 1⇔ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c+m) Proposition 2.2.
Equilibria C, B and A
⇒ 2s ≤ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c+m)
1 > q2 ≥ 0⇒ 2s ≤ (aM − aT ) < (c+m) + 2s
and
q1 > 1⇒ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) Equilibria C and B
⇒ (c+m) < (aM − aT ) < (c+m) + 2s
q2 > 1⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) + 2s
and
q1 > 1⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) Equilibrium C
⇒ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) + 2s
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Table 3: Equilibria (c+m) < 2s
Parameter conditions Equilibria
q2 < 0⇔ (aM − aT ) < 2s
and
q1 ≤ 1⇔ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c+m) Equilibria B and A
⇒ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c+m)
q2 < 0⇔ (aM − aT ) < 2s
and
q1 > 1⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) Equilibrium B
⇒ 2s > (aM − aT ) > c+m
q2 ≥ 0⇔ (aM − aT ) ≥ 2s
and
q1 ≤ 1⇔ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c+m) Not applicable
⇒ (aM − aT ) ≥ 2s and (aM − aT ) ≤ (c+m)
1 > q2 ≥ 0⇔ 2s ≤ (aM − aT ) < (c+m) + 2s
and
q1 > 1⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) Equilibria C and B
⇒ 2s ≤ (aM − aT ) < (c+m) + 2s
q2 > 1⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) + 2s
and
q1 > 1⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) Equilibrium C
⇒ (aM − aT ) > (c+m) + 2s
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Appendix B
Table 4: Data and Sources
GDP at market prices 2000 1980-2003: PROMETEIA
Gross Fixed Investment 1980-2003: PROMETEIA
at 2000 prices
Corruption Level 1980-2003: ISTAT
“Annuario Statistico e Giudiziario”
various years
Criminal Judges 1980-2003: Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze
“Dipendenti delle Amministrazioni Statali”
various issues
Police Forces 1980-2003: Ministero del Tesoro
“Dipendenti delle Amministrazioni Statali”
various issues
Population 1980-2003: PROMETEIA
Public Infrastructures Spending 1980-2003: PROMETEIA
at 2000 prices
Public consumption 1980-2003: PROMETEIA
at 2000 prices
Human Capital 1980-2003: Costantini and Destefanis (2008)
Notes: i) The legal statistics of ISTAT are one of the main sources for region-based
corruption analysis. Corruption crimes fall into two classes of crimes considered by Istat.
The first class includes crimes by public officials considered by the criminal code (arts.
“314” and “322”) and referred to as embezzlement of public funds or misappropriation
(art. “324”); the second class concerns private interests in official deeds. The data
considered in this study refer to the total number of crimes classified by ISTAT with
classification numbers from “286” to “294”, namely: “286” Embezzlement of public funds
“287” Embezzlement by drawing profit from another’s error “288” Misappropriation to the
damage of private individuals “289” Extortion “290” Corruption for official deeds “291”
Corruption for deeds contrary to official duties “292” Corruption of a party in charge of a
public service “293” Corruptor’s liability “294” Incitement to corruption; ii) Police forces
data include: Arma dei Carabinieri (paramilitary police) and Polizia di Stato (state police)
(see “Conto Annuale”, “Dipendenti delle amministrazioni statali”, codice “9”, Ministero
del Tesoro); iii: Judges data include several categories (see codice “12”).
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Appendix C
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Variables N Obs. Mean Min Max Std.Dev.
GDP
(growth rate)
479 4.4 -9.6 5.6 0.559
M1 478 2.230 0.967 3.204 0.336
M2 460 5.446 0.693 7.577 1.155
M3 460 8.448 5.575 10.822 1.010
Investment/GDP 480 0.228 0.142 0.448 0.056
Public Consumption/GDP 480 0.248 0.129 0.396 0.067
Human Capital 480 7.224 4.498 9.144 1.060
Notes: The growth rate of real per capita GDP is expressed in percentages. With
reference to public consumption and investment, the unit of measurement used is millions
of Euro at 2000 constant prices. M1, M2 and M3 indicate the three measures of monitoring.
Appendix D
We consider the ratio between the number of detected corruption crimes and
the estimated total number of corruption crimes. The number of reported
corruption crimes is both a function of the corruption level, and a function of
the level of prevention in place to reduce the phenomenon. The probability of
being detected q, may be estimated by the ratio between detected corruption
crimes, Co, and the estimated total number of corruption crimes, Ce :
q =
Co
Ce
(16)
Most econometric studies find that corruption is a function of several
variables (the legal system, government intervention, probability of being
detected, etc.). Therefore we can define the estimated total number of
corruption crimes:
Ce = A ∗ IP ∗ qγ (17)
where IP is public infrastructure spending, q is the probability of being
detected and the constant A represents all the other variables that affect
corruption. The rationale for focusing on public infrastructure spending is
that activities surrounding public works construction are the classic locus
of illegal monetary activities between public officials, both elected and
appointed, and businesses. Although corruption occurs in settings other
than public works contracting, the process of public works contracting is,
because of inherent informational asymmetries, especially vulnerable, as
substantial empirical and theoretical literatures suggest (see McMillan, 1991;
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Porter and Zona, 1993)15. We assume that q is a non linear function of the
monitoring level:
q =Monitoringα (18)
By substituting (17) and (18) in (16), we have:
Monitoringα =
Co
A ∗ IP ∗Monitoringαγ ⇒ (19)
Co
IP
= A ∗Monitoringα(γ+1) (20)
Taking logs, equation (20) written as follows:
log
Co
IP
= logA+ α(γ + 1)logMonitoring (21)
Then we use log CoIP as a proxy for the dynamic of logMonitoring:
logmonitor = log
detected corruption crimes
public infrastracture spending
15A study of press reports of Italian corruption during the twentieth century (through
1986) finds that only 17 percent of cases of corruption reported in the press concerned
public works contracting. Larger percentages were reported for building permits (28
percent) and public services (20 percent) (see Golden and Picci, 2005).
26
  
 
Authors: Raffaella Coppier, Mauro Costantini, Gustavo Piga 
 
Title: Do "Clean Hands" Ensure Healthy Growth? Theory and Practice in the Battle Against 
Corruption 
 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series 238 
 
Editor: Robert M. Kunst (Econometrics) 
Associate Editors: Walter Fisher (Macroeconomics), Klaus Ritzberger (Microeconomics)  
 
ISSN: 1605-7996 
© 2009 by the Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna   +43 1 59991-0  Fax +43 1 59991-555  http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
 
 ISSN: 1605-7996 
 
